# Secure Bootstrapping for loT devices

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- > Doctor of Science (DSc.) Tech. Aalto University
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- > Master of Science (MSc.) 2010-2012: Security and Mobile Comp.
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
## My Work

- Applied network security research
- > Hands on coding: C/C++/Java/Python/Web
- Formal models
- Security standardization at IETF
  - Chair Light Weight-Implementation Guidance (LWIG)
  - Chair EAP Method Update (EMU)
- > Best paper awards: ACM Ubicomp 2014, IEEE IoT 2015
- > Patents and IPR: 50+ international patents

## Why work on bootstrapping?

- Many protocols and tools for security:
  - > Transport Layer Security (TLS)
  - Datagram TLS (DTLS) for UDP oriented traffic
  - Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2)
  - > X509 certificates
- > Little appetite for:
  - New crypto: identity-based crypto, attribute-based encryption
  - New lightweight protocols that save x bytes, or is faster etc.
- > Bootstrapping:
  - > This IoT device is mine -> associate it with my user account
  - > This IoT device is trusted -> allow it connect to the network

#### draft-aura-eap-noob



### What about this IoT?













Always ready, connected, and fast. **Just ask.** 









## The Security problem - Challenges

#### > Non-expert users

- A typical home user does not have a computer science degree
- > Even enterprise IT administrators are only marginally better

#### Scalability

> How do I manage 2,3,4 to 100s of devices


#### Minimal User Interface

> How do I configure an Amazon dash button


#### > Lifecycle

- What do I do when my Internet-connected toaster is no longer supported
  - (Revolv smart hub: <a href="http://revolv.com/">http://revolv.com/</a>)

- Cloud-connected IoT appliance
- New IoT appliance has no owner or domain, no credentials for cloud or Wi-Fi
- > Need to:
  - > connect the device to access network
  - > register the device to AAA/cloud server
  - > EAP-NOOB does both
- Security from a single user-assisted out-of-band message between peer device and AAA server







## EAP-NOOB protocol – high level view

- > Protocol for new devices:
  - 1. Initial exchange in-band: ECDH over EAP
  - Out-of-band step: one user-assisted message, in either direction
  - 3. Completion exchange in-band: authentication and key confirmation over EAP

>OOB step should not be not repeated. Reconnect exchange for rekeying, algorithm upgrade etc.

## EAP-NOOB security details

- Authentication protocol details (with OOB from peer to server):
  - Initial ECDH without authentication
  - OOB message contains secret N<sub>oob</sub> and fingerprint H<sub>oob</sub>
  - MAC with N<sub>oob</sub> authenticates ECDH key in both directions
  - Additionally, H<sub>oob</sub> authenticates ECDH key to AAA server
  - $\bullet$  Knowing  $N_{\text{oob}}$  authorizes the server and user to take control of the peer device
- OOB channel should protect both secrecy and integrity
  - Double protection: failure of one of these does not cause complete loss of security

## Deploying EAP-NOOB

#### What is the cost?

- The EAP method implemented only in AAA/cloud server and peer devices
- No changes to the Authenticator (AP)
- No new code in access-network AAA server
- Access network admin chooses a AAA/cloud server and configures realm-to-server mapping for "@eap-noob.net"
- User must have accounts for accessing the organization's AAA/cloud server
- When OOB message is encoded as QR or NFC tag and scanned on smart phone, no phone app needed
- Home users would need WPA2-Enterprise and user accounts

## Comparing it with other options:

- Configuring the peer offline with all it needs
  - Peer UI may have only output and no suitable input
- Simply transferring a secret key to/from the peer?
  - OOB channel may be vulnerable to spying. EAP-NOOB can work with only integrity
- Static QR code with hash of device public key
  - EAP-NOOB establishes two-way trust
  - EAP-NOOB assigns a network and owner to the device
- Reading and writing configuration data over NFC
  - EAP-NOOB only requires one OOB message in one direction
  - EAP-NOOB supports a variety of OOB channels incl. NFC
- Home networks with shared passphrase
  - Devices need to be managed and revoked individually; WPA-Enterprise is better

## Summary:

- Join the discussion at emu@ietf.org
- Read, comment and ask questions
- Experimenting/Prototyping is always good